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U

nited States hegemony over the
international system has been the
norm since President George H.W.
Bush declared that the U.S. had the
ability to create a “New World Order” (Bush
1991). However, politicians in the United
States and in Europe have started to question
the role that the U.S. should take on the world
stage due to the aggressiveness of the Trump
Presidency and a subsequent loss of trust in
U.S. capabilities and motives (Emmott 2019).
Trump has made some rather dramatic
changes in his rhetoric regarding NATO. Due
to members’ perceived reluctance to pay for
military upkeep, Trump has taken a more
belligerent stance against NATO members
than any former president. Certainly, burden
sharing within the alliance has been an issue
of importance for several presidential
administrations prior to Donald Trump.
However, no other president has taken it so far
as to question and even decline to affirm
support for Article 5 which dictates mutual
defense within the alliance (Gray 2017).
President Trump has railed against NATO’s
members, specifically those in Europe, for not
contributing enough to the alliance. President
Trump has focused his attacks through the
lens of percentage of the gross domestic
product being applied to military and defense

capabilities. One should also take note of the
criticisms levied by past
administrations as well. President Obama and
President Bush both noted that they wanted
their European allies to contribute more to
NATO defense spending. Bush pointed out
that increased spending on European defense
would strengthen the forces of NATO, while
Obama took note of decreased defense
spending among European allies in 2014
(Collinson 2018). It would appear as though
American patience with NATO has somewhat
dwindled overtime. This has been a pressing
issue as indicated by former U.S. secretary of
defense Robert Gates who declared “NATO’s
future ‘dim if not dismal’” if it did not seek to
bolster its forces (Binnendijik 2016).
President Trump still clearly demonstrates a
more hostile approach that could shake up the
alliance. The true question is whether his
criticisms of European defense spending are
warranted.
Burden sharing within NATO is a far more
complex topic than just the amount of money
being spent on troops and technology. NATO
is an intricate alliance based on the concept of
collective action, a concept which aims to
maximize defensive capabilities in a wartime
scenario. The alliance requires that its
members uphold their militaries to a certain
budgetary and readiness standard so that all
1
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members may benefit from a general increase
in their military power. The aim of this paper
is to answer the question as to whether, and if
so why, non-U.S. NATO allies are free riding
in lieu of the charges levied by current and
former presidential administrations. This
paper will seek to determine levels of free
riding through the lens of three different
facets: NATO defense expenditures will be
considered, as well as two burden sharing case
studies in Libya and Afghanistan. Free riding
itself shall be defined in each case by the input
of relevant monetary, political, and tactical
contributions. If evidence demonstrates that
free riding is apparent, it is also important to
understand the factors that are encouraging
countries to engage in such activity. The
research will demonstrate that burden sharing
can be a very complex facet of NATO to
analyze, even though there are clear cases of
unequal burden sharing within the alliance.
Free riding will be made apparent by the
complexities present in the two case studies.
Furthermore, this paper will also take into
consideration the economic theory presented
regarding burden sharing and how it factors
into alliance cooperation.
LITERATURE REVIEW

The state of burden sharing within NATO
has had its fair share of criticisms since the
alliance’s conception. Critics have been quick
to point out that the United States appears to
bear a heavy share of the defense burden
while other members appear to free ride and
take advantage of U.S. military power. Truly,
debates surrounding burden sharing itself
remain contentious within the NATO
community. Burden-sharing literature was
initiated with an article by Mancur Olson and
Richard Zeckhauser entitled “An Economic
Theory of Alliances.” The paper was written
in 1966, and it aimed at exploring (through
economic theory) how burden sharing works
within alliances. They concluded that other
countries would attempt to free ride on other
members within the alliance in order to get the

max extent of benefits while providing a
minimal amount of support. This conclusion
was profound and formulated what became
known as the “exploitation hypothesis.” They
came to this conclusion through the
examination of pure public goods within an
alliance. According to Olson and Zeckhauser,
a pure public good can be described as “nonrivalrous” and non-excludable.” A more
technical understanding of their conclusion is
as follows: the pure public good of deterrence,
which is provided by the richest country,
results in the other alliance members free
riding on commitments of the richest member.
This became part of a theory of organizations
which is known as “collective action”. (Olson
and Zeckhauser 1966).
Olson and Zeckhauser’s article on
collective action was influenced by an earlier
piece of research written by Mancur Olson
entitled The Logic of Collective Action: Public
Goods and the Theory of Groups. Olson’s
book explores how groups and organizations
work in order to further a common goal
through the utilization of economic theory.
Olson pointed out examples of how private
business, unions, and governments interact
with one another in order to make their sector
more profitable, receive concessions for
workers, or secure their nations. It is clear
that these examples can also be applied to
NATO, as Olson pointed out in his
aforementioned article with Zeckhauser. The
relevance of this book is that it sets the basis
for understanding how public goods can lead
to free riding in an organization such as
NATO. Olson’s conclusion, regarding how
the members of a group act, was that these
groups might find themselves to be at odds
with another member within the group which
might have the ability to increase security
output in an alliance like NATO. He also
pointed out that for this to work, there must be
some sort of sanction in place that encourages
members to pay into the organization. In

2
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NATO, there is no truly effective sanction to
discourage free riding behaviors (Olson 1971).
A great deal of research has been done to
expand on Olson and Zeckhauser’s work.
Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley’s work, for
example, summarized the various models
employed in the field. The initial theory,
proposed in “An Economic Theory of
Alliances,” of a pure public good model was
considered to be too restrictive and did not
take into account a multitude of other factors
for which a “joint-product model” would seem
to make up. For example, the joint-product
model includes a high ratio of excludable
benefits which changes the idea behind
collective action in an alliance. These
findings weakened the “exploitation
hypothesis” since the equation is no longer
limited to the pure public good of deterrence.
The joint-product model still points out other
ways that countries will attempt to free ride on
other allies by factoring in those excludable
benefits. It is still possible for a deficit to be
apparent, though not as likely (Hartley 2001).
Sandler and Hartley also worked together
on an earlier piece which attempted to
reevaluate the factors that go into calculating
the equity involved in burden sharing. The
earlier work contributed to the 2001 paper
considering that it provided new criterion to
look at collective action. They pointed out
various new factors that could be considered
viable contributions to the alliance and could
result in a more equitable share of the burden
between nations. In sum, Sandler and Hartley
pointed out how different measures of burden
sharing should be applied and to what degree.
For example, military budgets and a nation’s
willingness to engage in a conflict are two
very different measures, but both are equally
important to understanding whether a country
is truly shouldering their fair share of the
burden. The ultimate conclusion of this paper
is that nations will tend to pick a specific
measurement which shows that they are
shouldering more of the burden than other

nations while not paying attention to the range
of other factors involved in contributing to the
alliance (Hartley 1999).
Discussions of free riding within NATO
on the American side argue that the United
States is simply being fooled into providing
defense. They believe the U.S. should be
wary of supporting wealthy European nations
that don’t want to spend as much on their
militaries. Alan Tonelson’s early 2000s
article highlighted this mood as he explored
how changes in international geo-politics
appear to be putting the U.S. at greater risk.
Tonelson conveyed the risk associated with
NATO through both material and non-material
causes. He argued that U.S. actions leave the
country exposed to more precarious situations.
Tonelson mentioned that there is a greater risk
that the U.S. can be dragged into “non-article
5” conflicts even though America’s original
objective was to keep the power of Russia in
check through its military presence. Tonelson
pointed to the example that U.S. troops
stationed in European countries are at risk of
injury in an attack (particularly from terrorists
or irregular forces) and could be stuck in the
middle of an unnecessary conflict. Tonelson
also pointed to Kosovo as an example: the
U.S. was influenced to become involved
simply to strengthen NATO’s credibility even
though its European member nations were
contributing far less to the alliance operations
in comparison to those of the U.S. (Tonelson
2000).
From a financial perspective, an earlier
article written by Jyonni Khana and others
indicates that alliance members in NATO, and
in the U.N., are in fact free riding on larger
nations such as the United States. The authors
concluded that there is a wide gap in the
equity of burden sharing. Their analysis
focused heavily on peace keeping
expenditures between 1976 and 1996. Jointproduct models and collective action theory
were employed to study the financial
contributions of the various countries. The
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level of fiscal support from the larger
countries far outweighed those of the smaller
nations and indicated a great level of free
riding (Jyonni Khanna et al 1998).
More recent studies have tried to take a
more mixed methods approach; this is
apparent in Jo Jakobson’s article. Jakobson
attempted to draw on the collective action
approach and the risk-responsibility sharing
school. Jakobsen ultimately factored in the
different variables both schools use, but he
comes to differing conclusions. He started the
study with the standard input measure, (where
one looks at what countries put into the
alliance alone) and it became obvious that
European NATO free rides from this
analytical perspective. Furthermore, Jakobsen
found that non-material free riding can occur
when a U.S. presence in the country of
operations is significant as compared to its
allies. A further observation demonstrated
that other allied countries showed a low
willingness to fight. He also mentioned that
the importance of United States military
spending has to do with other variables. The
United States was engaged in various
operations throughout the world, especially in
Europe. The United States’ projection of
power could essentially outweigh the lessened
spending of European NATO allies.
Jakobsen’s conclusion is to remain cautious
when attempting to decipher whether
European NATO in fact free rides (Jakobsen
2018).
Examinations of free riding within NATO
require a more nuanced approach, and Timo
Kivimaki’s work added new variables to the
equations associated with economic
examinations of free riding. Kivimaki
produced three new variables to consider in
the debate, including: a calculation of that
country’s power, a variable about that
country’s security guarantees to its allies, and
the reliance of the U.S. on NATO in out-ofarea efforts. Kivimaki relied heavily on
Ringsmose’s model for determining levels of

burden sharing. He employed these new
variables to essentially say that European free
riding appears to be on the decline as
evidenced by lessened security guarantees.
Kivimaki indicated that there had been an
imbalance in the past, but he claimed that the
gap was beginning to shrink. Kivimaki’s
evidence was supported by the inclusion of
these new and telling variables. (Kivimaki
2019).
Hans Binnendijk explored the problem of
free riding within NATO from an historical
standpoint. Binnendijk reviewed the pros and
cons of spending within the alliance since its
inception, and he discussed how the United
States had attempted to address budgetary
issues with its allies in the past. He concluded
that recent Russian aggression toward Ukraine
could provide an opening for the United States
to put more pressure on its European allies.
The increased pressure could, in turn, coerce
European allies to commit more to defense
spending and effectively lessen the burden
being placed on the U.S. Binnendijk also
went through multiple policy proposals that
would help initiate this pressure, and he also
delved into how each facet would help to
equalize burden sharing. Part of Binnendijk’s
broader argument is that European NATO is
changing because new geo-political
considerations have become more important
since the fall of the Soviet Union (Binnendijk
2016).
BURDEN SHARING FROM AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE

One of the most prominent ways to
approach burden sharing is from the
perspective of spending. The way that NATO
manages its forces is through each country’s
defense spending. The alliance was founded
on the notion of collective defense. This is the
idea that an attack on one ally is considered a
direct attack on all the other allies (as outlined
in Article 5 of the treaty). Collective defense
stipulates that each member state must
contribute a significant number of resources to
4
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their military, and thus these contributions
would ensure that all members of the alliance
would be capable to come to the defense of
their allies.
NATO was a much smaller organization
during the Cold War than it is today, but it
grew overtime. The alliance was founded in
1949, and it was originally comprised of 12
countries. It grew to include 16 countries
between 1949 and 1989, and by 2019 it had 29
formal allies. As early as 1950, the U.S.
attempted to coax Europe into providing more
for its own defense. One specific attempt was
when the U.S. tried to take advantage of the
onset of the Korean war: “President Truman…
committed four US army divisions to Europe.
In return, France promised to take the
initiative in the creation of a European
Defence Community,” (Ringsmose 2010).
Truman’s goal was to initiate a “quid-proquo” where the U.S. would provide some level
of defense for Europe while he expected it to
develop its own militaries in return.
Essentially, Truman’s goal defined the
essence of burden sharing diplomacy for the
U.S. throughout the Cold War. Despite the
president’s efforts, Congress was adamant in
reevaluating defense spending within NATO
(Ringsmose 2010). This push and pull would
continue for years to come, but it was apparent
that the U.S. was contributing far more to
defense spending than its European
counterparts. This demonstrates some level of
free riding (see Figure 1) (Ringsmose 2010).
Collective defense, at this point, included
different factors that modern burden sharing
no longer focuses on as much. Nuclear
deterrence was more important with the Soviet
Bear lurking, and preparedness for a
conventional or nuclear attack was given more
emphasis. The reinvention of NATO as an
“out-of-area” force in modern burden sharing
has changed the way that spending is viewed.
Now, the U.S. no longer needs to focus on its
nuclear umbrella as the most important facet
of collective defense. Instead, spending can

be dedicated to more conventional forces in
order to deal with rogue nations and limiting
(on a smaller scale) the proliferation of
nuclear weapons (Hartley 2001). These
changes, therefore, open the door for Europe
to contribute more to NATO by increasing its
technological and strategic capabilities.
The United States has been, and still is,
the largest spending member of NATO.
America contributed 51.1% of the alliance’s
combined GDP and 71.1% of its combined
defense expenditure in 2017 (Macias 2018).
Furthermore, the United States dedicated more
of its GDP (at 3.31%) than any other country.
23 of the other 28 members failed to meet the
proposed goal of “2% of GDP being dedicated
to defense spending” as was agreed upon at
the Wales Summit in 2014 (NATO.int). In
fact, most countries do not seem to be on track
to even reach the goal of 2% by 2020.
However, there has been a slight overall
increase in spending, and estimates for
defense expenditure as a share of GDP
indicate that European NATO members are
contributing more to their defense budgets
than they have in the past.
In addition to the overall view of GDP, it
is also important to consider to which projects
the money is being applied; a more concrete
understanding of specific expenditures gives a
better view of the overall effectiveness of a
country’s forces. NATO also has a minimum
threshold of 20% of GDP expenditure toward
equipment when considering the greater
context of a country’s GDP being applied to
defense (Antonoaie 2018). Only 11 out of 28
NATO member-states are adhering to this
threshold as of 2017 (NATO.int).
Luxembourg dedicates the greatest portion of
it’s GDP for military expenditure, to
equipment. Overall, only 0.5 percent of its
GDP is contributed to military expenditures.
This means that the potency of Luxembourg’s
forces is still minimal at best. The power of
each force is significantly reduced in
technological advantage because most
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countries are not upholding their spending
promises for equipment. The category of
equipment also includes R&D expenditures
for major projects and munitions. The lack of
spending in this category further proves that
not enough countries are investing in the
technology to modernize their military. The
lack of funding is an incredible risk because
the conduct of warfare is constantly evolving
(Dubik 1). The U.S. dedicated 25.73% of its
total defense expenditure on equipment (part
of the percentage includes upkeep) in 2017
which means that far more work is also being
applied to critical military R&D. These
expenditures force the U.S. to maintain its
technological superiority, but other countries
are lagging and leaving more of the burden to
the United States.
Defense spending has always been a major
point of contention for the United States and
its other allies. Presidential administrations
have constantly critiqued the lack of spending
within NATO, especially the lack of spending
by European allies. The Bush and Obama
administrations both found spending levels to
be too low. Obama specifically stated, “Free
riders aggravate me” (Goldberg 2016). Of
course, their frustrations went far beyond
simple rhetoric. The issue of defense
spending has taken a new level of importance
under the Trump Administration. Trump has
demonstrated far more grief toward the
alliance and has stirred up trouble in the
process. Within this context, it is imperative
to understand whether free riding is occurring
from a fiscal perspective.
At first glance, it would appear obvious
that the United States is indeed carrying the
alliance in terms of expenditures on defense.
This has been the case since NATO’s
inception, and has been explored in depth
through collective action theory. Mancur
Olson and Richard Zeckhauser’s piece
confirms that smaller nations free ride, and
they rely on the largest nation to provide most
of the public goods available to those within

the alliance. The theory behind collective
action seems to illustrate how straightforward
it can be for countries to free ride: “Since the
benefits of any action an individual takes to
provide a public or organizational good also
go to others, individuals acting independently
do not have an incentive to provide optimal
quantities of such goods,” (Olson 1966). The
economic models show how nations will
adhere to this method of thinking: the country
that is the largest (and seeks to increase
defensive capabilities) will continue to
increase its own expenditures while smaller
nations leave the spending to said nation.
When applying this theory, it makes sense
that a rather sizable chunk of European
military expenditure shrank dramatically
leading up to the end of the Cold War in 1991.
American military investment between 1981
and 1990 remained at relatively the same
level. On the other hand, European NATO
members induced a drop of 10.3 percentage
points. Furthermore, U.S. military personnel
numbers were reduced by 7.4 percent, but
Western Europe’s fell at a higher rate of 10.2
percent. By the year 1989, 36 percent of
NATO’s defense forces were being provided
by the U.S. In addition, the U.S. also
accounted for 64.7 percent of total NATO
defense expenditures (Tonelson 2000). The
United States prioritized its spending on
defense expansion since it was still in
competition with the power of the slowly
declining Soviet Union. Hence, European
NATO members were decreasing defense
spending while taking advantage of the United
States’ continued focus on contending with
weakened Soviet military programs.
The models produced by Olson and
Zeckhauser have been expanded by other
scholars since their creation, and updated
implications must be considered in order to
paint a more comprehensive picture. Burden
Sharing can also be analyzed by using what is
known as the joint-product model of alliances.
The joint-product model digresses from the
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view that alliance contributions to defense are
pure public goods from which all members of
the alliance can benefit. An article written by
Jacques von Ypersele de Strihau points out the
fact that a country’s defense expenditures also
provide benefits that solely increase the
national goods (as opposed to alliance goods)
and are instead excludable benefits. Also, he
notes that these are joint products of national
defense expenditures (de Strihau 1967). He
goes on to argue that “The value given to each
country to these strictly national benefits
should be deducted from the defense
expenditures to obtain the ‘burden’ borne by
each country for the provision of the
international public good,” (de Strihau 1967).
These strictly national benefits include a range
of potential categories, including economic
and political advantages. This difference in
views changes the outlook on burden sharing
from an economic perspective. As noted by
Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, the
implications of a joint-product model could
potentially even the playing field between
NATO members and reduce the relevance of
the exploitation hypothesis put forth by Olson
and Zeckhauser. This implies that the larger
country may be profiting from a high level of
excludable benefits. This point of view could
indeed have merit when looking back at
Tonelson’s view of defense spending between
1981 and 1990. The United States, at the
time, was still providing a great deal of
funding to defense while European allies were
reducing their spending. One can assume that
the joint-product model perspective would
show that the United States was providing a
large proportion of excludable benefits for
itself. Whereas increased deterrence would
have been a pure public good from which
European NATO members benefitted, the
revelation of the joint-product model resulted
in the inclusion of the political and economic
factors associated with it. Increased defense
spending in the U.S. had strong political
backing, and it would have provided the

excludable benefit of greater political support
for the national government’s administration.
Furthermore, defense spending would
contribute to the work force and economic
strength of a country as more money funneled
into that industry. In comparison, European
NATO countries could have had a more equal
ratio of burden sharing since they were not
privy to the excludable benefits inherent
within U.S. spending.
It follows, therefore, that it is important to
take into consideration the additional variables
of the joint-product model if one is to better
understand burden sharing. This ensures that
the correct variables are accounted for and
plugged into calculations accordingly. The
joint-product model is where ideas of material
and non-material burden sharing can begin to
play a rather pivotal role in understanding how
NATO members ultimately benefit and
provide for the alliance. These views of
material and non-material burdens became
more prominent after the end of the Cold War.
This was due to a shift in mission directives
spurred by the onset of the “New World
Order.” The new order had the U.S. at its
helm, and it formed as a result of the end of
the bipolar system of the Cold War. Now, the
focus was not so much on deterrence against
Russia as it was on security operations and a
broader notion of conflict prevention across
the globe. New burdens would be introduced
into the equation as security operations would
be moved “out-of-area.”
One such example is military casualties as
explored by Jo Jakobsen. Jakobsen points out
how the use of boots on the ground, a method
of contributing to security operations, leads to
the obvious risk of casualties. But he also
notes how these casualties now contribute to
the variable of political support on the national
level (Jakobsen 2018). From a joint-product
model perspective, the values of those
excludable goods are subject to change as
forces are actively being deployed and put in
harm’s way. Jakobsen also points out how
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rules of engagement for each specific ally can
affect the general effectiveness of their forces
and, therefore, lessen or enhance their share of
the burden. More stringent rules of
engagement can, of course, lead to less
casualties enhancing the excludable goods
from which the nation benefits (or, in other
words, lessening allied access to the pure
public goods that country produces) (Jakobsen
2018). Hence, this complicates the entire
equation of burden sharing as the variables
and their values are subject to more scrutiny
than they once were. This leads into an
analysis of the case studies of Libya and
Afghanistan and how burden sharing can be
looked at in greater depth.
BURDEN SHARING FROM THE PERSPECTIVE
OF THE ISAF IN AFGHANISTAN

The war in Afghanistan proved to be long
and costly for all the countries it has involved.
The war has cost the U.S. approximately $975
billion since 2001 from a fiscal perspective
alone. This makes it only second to military
costs during World War II (which have been
adjusted for inflation) which were $4.1 trillion
(McCarthy 2019). Furthermore, the U.S. has
suffered over 2,000 casualties and more than
20,000 wounded in Afghanistan’s Operation
Enduring Freedom between 2001 and 2014
(US DOD 2019). In comparison to Afghan
coalition allies, the general cost in blood and
treasure does not seem to align. In terms of
fiscal costs, the U.K. precedes the U.S. at only
£37 billion (approximately $47 billion). The
difference in troop casualties is also
significant, with the UK incurring 455 deaths,
Canada 158, Germany 54, and France 86 all
from 2001 to the present (Soldiers Killed in
Action in Afghanistan 2001-2019). It would
appear as though the burden is primarily being
shifted on the U.S. in terms of concrete
allocations and losses regarding costs and
casualties.
These numbers, taken at face value alone,
are not enough to understand the complete
picture of burden sharing in Afghanistan. A

study written by Peter Marton and Nik Hynek
demonstrates an interesting graph which views
troop deployments and costs in lieu of that
country’s GDP and population size. With
reference to figure 2 in the appendix, one will
note the contributions of countries such as
Denmark and Estonia (Hynek 2012). Both
countries appear to have provided an
incredibly small number of troops in
comparison to countries such as the U.S. and
the U.K. However, if one refers to the column
“People per one soldier deployed in ISAF,”
the rank of these countries is far higher than
before. Denmark is shown to come in at 3rd
and Estonia in 4th, and they are preceded only
by the U.S. and the U.K. Furthermore, the
financial burden of countries such as Estonia,
Poland, and Romania accounts for more of
their “share of GDP” in their “cost per troop”
than even the US (who is in 4th place). From
this perspective, it would appear as though the
countries are, in fact, pulling more of their
weight. The importance of looking at factors
like these is that it places a country’s
contributions into the greater context of their
economic and deployable capabilities. Surely,
a smaller country such as Estonia could never
contribute as much money or troops as the
U.S., but it could provide a similar if not
greater ratio of “troops to population” or
“troops to cost” than some of the larger
nations in the coalition. The last interesting
fact to gather from figure two of the appendix
is that the country that takes up the greatest
percentage share of ISAF forces is Canada.
One should note that the countries which are
racking up decent numbers represent only a
handful out of 29.
These elements are incredibly interesting
since Operation Enduring Freedom was
started as part of the United States War on
Terror. Since this war was started by the U.S.,
it has become more important to determine
whether these countries were free riding in
Afghanistan. However, the significance of
troop levels, troop casualties, and fiscal
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contributions alone is not enough to provide a
full representation of the burden sharing
taking place in Afghanistan. Other important
factors to note are not so easily quantified.
One such variable is the potential intrapolitical cost of a country’s contributions to
operations and budget, not wholly dedicated to
military expenditures, (e.g. financial
reconstruction, aid and budgetary funds for the
Afghan government) (Jakobsen 2018). In
2009, for example, Obama’s policy of surging
troops into Afghanistan was initiated.
According to a Pew Research Center table,
most people (from the surveyed countries)
opposed the increase of troops in Afghanistan
(refer to figure 3 of appendix) (Auxier 2015).
Despite this opposition, there was a general
increase in troops between 2009 and 2011
from those very same NATO countries
involved in the survey (Rogers 2009). This
demonstrates a willingness on the part of these
countries to sacrifice political clout with their
constituents in order to contribute to alliance
operations. In fact, most of the NATO
countries involved increased their troop levels
leaving only Norway, the Netherlands, Latvia,
Iceland, and Belgium to remove some or all
their forces from Afghanistan. Canada also
reinforced its claims to leave Afghanistan
(Siegel 2009).
The extent of aid provided in order to help
rebuild Afghanistan is the other significant
measure that is mentioned. Reference to
figure 4 demonstrates various countries that
have provided aid to Afghanistan between
2002 and 2008. Among the NATO countries
on this table, the U.S. has clearly donated the
most, with the U.K. and Germany being the
next highest NATO donors consecutively.
One would be remiss to not mention that the
final aid total disbursed by the U.S. is in fact
$5,022.7 million. The U.S. donation amount
is still significantly higher than that of its
other allies: the U.K.’s final disbursement is
closer to $1266.3 million, and Germany’s is
closer to $767.84 million. Aid promised

(while demonstrating what could be a desire to
take on a fair share of the burden) is irrelevant
since the actual burden sharing aspect comes
down to what was spent. (Fayez 2012).
When looking at Afghanistan as a whole,
it would still seem as though the U.S. is taking
on a much larger share of the burden
compared to its allies. In terms of dedicating
military funding it tops the charts even despite
some of its smaller allies’ attempts to pull
their weight in terms of force deployments.
Context does show that some of the smaller
countries are providing a great deal in lieu of
their reduced capabilities, but some of the
more powerful countries are not making up for
deficiencies where they could. This lack of
support is especially highlighted when looking
at the deployment of their forces: “The
European contribution to the actual combat
theater was minimal and primarily included
British forces in the form of air assistance.
Because the initial stages of the campaign
involved almost exclusively the use of Special
Forces and air power, technological and other
capacity issues limited the role European
forces could play” (Siegel 2009). This is
further proved by the thought process of
NATO when considering whether to deploy a
peacekeeping force outside of Kabul in 2002.
NATO considered Great Britain to be the only
other country capable of quickly deploying an
effective force in the region (Jones 2009).
Moreover, the U.S. appeared to be taking the
lead regarding reconstruction efforts; 14 out of
19 provincial reconstruction teams (PRT)
were manned by the U.S. leaving only 5 of
them to be led by ISAF and NATO countries
in 2005 (Rashid 2008). In addition, the
effectiveness of NATO forces and their
contributions were not up to par despite their
efforts to contribute: “In 2006, NATO
promised to place a PRT in all of
Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces.
However, the Establishment of “national
caveats” stipulating what its PRT force could
and could not do was to paralyze NATO’s
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effectiveness in combating the Taliban,”
(Rashid 2008).
Furthermore, these countries’ disregard for
public opinion and their willingness to
sacrifice their political power back home
would seem to indicate a discrepancy in the
ideas put forth through collective action. Such
actions are in direct opposition to the basic
premise of the exploitation hypothesis since
those countries were still willing to put their
forces in harm’s way for an operation that is
more important for the U.S. than most of the
other NATO allies. In contrast, one could
argue that U.S. leaders were also putting their
political clout back home at risk with their
massive deployments of troops. While
Canada made up the larger share of NATO
forces earlier in the war, the U.S. currently
makes up 12,000 of the remaining 17,148
NATO troops deployed (War in Afghanistan
Global Conflict Tracker). When Obama had
asked in April 2009 for European NATO
members to contribute more forces along with
his surge of troops, Canada (as well as the
Netherlands) reconfirmed a prior commitment
to pull troops out of the country as a direct act
of defiance against the surge (Siegel 2009).
This is an indication that allies were beginning
to contribute less resources as time went on,
and this would seem to suggest that the cost of
providing forces was no longer worth the
benefit of appeasing the U.S. and “keeping the
Americans in” (Matlary 2014) the alliance.
While this does not account for the spending
in aid, the great reduction in allied forces
removes the costs of gambling political clout
and being influenced by domestic constraints,
which is one of the greater, if not the greatest,
factors in burden sharing today (Matlary
2014). This is also backed up by Ringsmose
who states that “As NATO became involved
in out-of-area operations… the burden-sharing
debates increasingly came to focus not only on
deployable military assets, but also on the fair
sharing of risks,” (Ringsmose 2010). Instead,
“checkbook diplomacy,” which reduces the

argument to simply how much money one
provided, began to be frowned upon by the
international community. The importance of
domestic constraints is essential, and the U.S.
was bearing a heavier share of the burden in
this regard. Consider that “Fifty-seven
percent of Americans, including 69 percent of
military veterans, said they would support a
decision by the president to remove all troops
from Afghanistan,” (“Public Opinion on
Afghanistan War: 2018 Poll”).
BURDEN SHARING FROM THE PERSPECTIVE
OF LIBYA

At first glance, the onset of the 2011
conflict in Libya had potential to provide a
new template of how burden sharing could
work between America and its NATO allies.
Libya is within the general proximity of
Europe, but the United States itself did not
have any major stake in the conflict at all.
U.S. interests are relevant to burden sharing
because they bring into question how willing
America is to commit its resources to a
conflict that is not directly related to its
national security. In the beginning, President
Obama was hesitant over what role to play in
the ongoing developments in Libya. Obama
took a more cautious approach until the
situation deteriorated into further chaos.
Eventually, Operation Odyssey Dawn was put
into motion and the U.S. was going to work
alongside its allies while utilizing its strategic
command in a targeted air campaign. Obama
wanted the U.S. to engage in a primarily
assistive role while NATO allies would
engage in the bulk of hard operations which
was contrary to how operations had been run
in the past. The administration was adamant
that absolutely no U.S. troops were going to
be deployed to the region, and Obama
outlined a plan for U.S. involvement. The
plan radically altered how the military
typically allocated its resources to such
operations. Instead of having the U.S. invest
the largest share of military assets to the
operation (as it had done for virtually all other
10
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operations), Obama wanted to take a more
restrained approach. He wanted the U.S. to
move in with purpose and strength in order to
break through Libyan defenses; then, US
forces would pull back while only providing
capabilities that the other NATO allies lacked
from a military standpoint (Chiviss 2014).
This military plan indicated a completely
different level of practical burden sharing.
Rather than the U.S. supplying more of its
forces in harm’s way, it was instead using its
unique military role to direct allied forces and
provide cohesion for NATO in the areas
where it was lacking. From the perspective of
a reduced U.S. role, it would appear as though
a large share of the burden was suddenly
shifted away from the U.S. and onto others in
the alliance. One of the main reasons Obama
took this position was to reduce the strain on
taxpayers and the military back home
(Hallams 2012). Obama’s desire to satisfy his
constituency plays into the excludable benefit
of political clout. Since the administration
had effectively increased its excludable
benefit, there must be a reduction of pure
public goods since the U.S. would no longer
contribute as much. This implies that other
NATO allies were putting much more on the
line, and the value of the pure public goods
they provided increased. With their forces
being put out on the “front lines,” it was the
lives of their soldiers, the wear of their
equipment, and the spending of their money
that was being allocated to more of the
operation than had been the case in the past
(Hallams 2012).
When one takes a concrete look at the
numbers involved in Libya, a different story
can be gleaned. The first major piece of data
to note is the number of sorties that were
flown by NATO forces. Even though the U.S.
meant to engage in a far more constrained role
throughout the entire operation, it still
managed to fly the most sorties with a total of
2,000. The UK and France were not far
behind flying 1,300 and 1,200 sorties

respectively. While most sorties were flown
by non-U.S. NATO forces (75% to be exact),
this did not account for the lack of effective
force employed by them (Shanker 2011). The
U.S. still boasted the largest concentration of
forces in the region, and it surpassed all allies
in the categories of personnel, aircraft, ships,
and the deployment of cruise missiles. Unlike
the sorties, the United States greatly surpassed
its counterparts: the combined forces of the
U.K. and France were still not enough to
match the concentration of U.S. assets in any
of the categories (Rogers 2011). Tim
Hasebrouck points out that despite the U.S.
plan to pull back after the operation was in
motion, the U.S. still seemed to demonstrate
that it was “a prisoner of its size” since it
continued to provide essential military
assistance to the bulk of operations
(Hasebrouck 2016). The fact that the U.S.,
even in its reduced role, was forced to step up
to such a degree demonstrates two things:
1. In order for the alliance to function
properly, the U.S. must be involved in
a leading capacity at some level,
otherwise operations would become
far more costly to all allies.
2. NATO allies were severely lacking in
multiple facets of military readiness
and combat effectiveness as indicated
by the holes left for the U.S. to fill.
These implications are essential to
understanding the burden sharing dynamics of
NATO. Both implications would appear to
give credence to the theory of collective action
and its exploitation hypothesis. Since the U.S.
possessed such an overwhelming force and
well-funded military, most other allies were
counting on the U.S. and its position of power
to make up for their deficiencies. Therefore,
the other countries in NATO chose not to
spend as much on their militaries since they
knew that the U.S. would end up
strengthening the overall capability of the
alliance. This is what led to NATO allies
dedicating less of their GDP to critical
11
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military equipment and personnel which
would have helped to strengthen the alliance.
NATO’s lack of military effectiveness was
made apparent by several deficiencies.
According to an article written by Thom
Shanker and Eric Schmitt, the U.S. (and to a
lesser degree some of its more powerful allies)
had to “lead from behind.” Regarding the
sorties that were flown, “NATO does not have
a roster of experienced officers to do its own
targeting- the essence of successful air
warfare. Only the United States, Britain, and
France have targeteers up to modern
standards,” (Shanker 2011). The article also
goes on to point out that the U.S. decision to
let other allies lead revealed major
shortcomings regarding intelligence
gathering/reconnaissance equipment as well as
certain critical munitions (Shanker 2011). As
stated by Ivo Daalder and James Stavridis,
“The heavy reliance of alliance members on
the United States during the conflict
highlighted the cost of a decade of European
underinvestment in defense,” (Daalder 2012).
In the case of Libya, it would appear as
though the free riding of NATO allies forced
the US to engage in a heavily involved combat
role despite Obama’s initial reluctance.
It is also important to consider the
countries that did not take an active role in
Libya. A number of these countries were
simply unable to participate due to limits on
their forces and budgets. But when a country
like Germany decided to opt out of the
operations, there were greater implications at
large. Germany had the capability to provide
military assistance, but only participated in a
limited surveillance role and abstained from
the UN security council vote to authorize the
intervention. According to a website
dedicated to measuring military capabilities,
Germany is currently the 5th most powerful
member state of NATO (NATO Member
States Ranked by Military Strength). Poland,
while ranked 9th in terms of capability (NATO
Member States Ranked by Military Strength),

refrained from direct participation in the
operation and only supplied precision missiles
to its NATO allies (Daalder 2012). The lack
of unity within NATO would seem to
demonstrate an inability to act in a collective
manner. While some allies bear the brunt of
combat, others will simply engage in a
“supportive” role without truly placing any of
their forces in harm’s way. This is
problematic as the involvement of some of
these countries could have helped to relieve
the burden that was placed on the U.S. While
there likely still would have been major holes
for the U.S. to fill in terms of offensive
capabilities, these nation’s lack of support and
participation is yet another sign that free
riding was apparent in the Libyan
intervention. Unlike the more dedicated
efforts of allies such as the U.K. and France,
these absentee countries played to the tune of
the exploitation hypothesis by letting other
countries deal with the risks associated with
direct involvement.
It is also important to note that the
countries that did try to contribute more to
Libya, likely only did so in order to try and
appease the U.S. by trying to take a more
active role in the alliance. According to Jane
Matlary, “the present challenge to NATO
states in Europe is… to contribute and show
solidarity with the United States, [and] also to
take responsibility for security and defense
policy in lead roles, as in Libya… this
challenge comes at a time of deep budget cuts
and where risk willingness is part of burden
sharing. Military contributions must be…
ready for combat,” (Matlary 2014). This
demonstrates how European countries might
be unwilling to provide more to NATO at a
time when their nations are in “deep peace
mode” and not as conducive toward sending
their people into harm’s way. The fact that
countries such as the U.K. and France might
have only contributed to the alliance to
appease the U.S. while other countries are
focusing on their own domestic political
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factors, further demonstrates the splintering of
NATO cohesiveness. This, in turn, is another
factor that leads to the U.S. being forced to
make up for the lack of participation and
readiness of those unwilling countries.
CONCLUSION

The literature on burden sharing has
shown great development over the years
moving from a more pecuniary focus, to a
focus that incorporates a variety of
inconspicuous factors. From a deterrence and
pure public goods standpoint, the United
States is bearing an unfair share of the burden.
The simple fact that it is leading the way
economically (and in turn with the efficiency
and effectiveness of its forces) shows that
non-U.S. NATO allies are indeed benefitting
unfairly from its ally’s efforts. The decline in
NATO allied defense spending indicates the
acceptance of relying on U.S. capabilities and
letting their own forces bear less of the
financial responsibility associated with
collective defense.
However, the simplicity of this model does
not consider other factors that can be just as
important to burden sharing. The jointproduct model would seem to take better
account of factors that do not seem
immediately pertinent to burden sharing but
are without a doubt just as important. The
dedication of alliance forces can produce
strain in a political manner due to the potential
loss of life and the ramifications such losses
can have back home. Furthermore, the
introduction of excludable goods levels the
playing field in different ways. The massive
output of defense provided by the U.S., incurs
significant benefits that are only a positive for
the U.S. alone. The expansion of the defense
industry, for example, can provide jobs and
further stimulate the U.S. economy; however,
this is a good that other nations cannot benefit
from directly. This same idea can be
redirected back to non-U.S. NATO allies.
Many of them intend to focus more on

domestic issues at home while letting their
forces weaken under the greater protection of
the United States. With new threats on the
rise and a turn to out-of-area operations, it
becomes apparent that if the U.S. “is able to
provide politically or physically sufficient
levels of security for the rest of NATO’s
members in response… then other members
can free ride and will provide little additional
assistance. Therefore, we should expect even
more free riding than in the past,” (Siegel
2009).
Regarding Libya and Afghanistan, it
would appear as though NATO allies were
contributing to a more balanced and fair
system of burden sharing, but this is in fact
not the case. In Afghanistan, alliance
cooperation and burden sharing were on more
equal footing with the initial invocation of
Article 5. Countries were attempting to
provide military assistance to the operations
despite the limitations their economies and
populations imposed upon them. However,
there were only a few countries that provided
enough force in any truly effective sense.
While major allies such as Canada did indeed
provide a great deal for the alliance in the
beginning, support tapered off overtime.
Several other capable countries did not
dedicate as much as they could have, and even
when they did, their support provided little
strategic significance. Instead, U.S. forces
were providing for the bulk of the operation
while its allies were hampered by inefficient
forces and a reluctance to give in to U.S.
unilateralism. In addition, the restraints
placed on rules of engagement and other
factors significantly reduced the effectiveness
of their combat roles. This forced the U.S. to
pick up the slack, as it had done during the
Cold War, with its deterrence abilities. The
eventual decline in alliance involvement also
indicates support for collective action theory
as allies began to outweigh the costs to the
benefits of participating in combat operations
with the U.S.
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In Libya, on the other hand, the U.S.
attempted to reduce its role in combat
operations while NATO allies shouldered the
burden of putting their forces in potential
danger. While the U.S. was dedicating its
budget to strategic command, its allies were
making up for their lack of defense spending
by taking more responsibility through both
material and non-material variables. The
involvement of more subtle factors completely
changes the implications of collective action.
However, the statistics indicated that the U.S.
was still forced to engage in taking on a larger
share of the burden than it had anticipated or
even wanted. The other allies did in fact
break through domestic constraints by putting
their forces in harm’s way. But Hasebrouck’s
work showed that such constraints were not as
prominent because Libya was considered an
easier operation, and the U.S. still took on a
greater role. Furthermore, the implications of
increased U.S. involvement show in a
concrete way that free riding is occurring.
The inability of European forces to deal with
the realities of modern combat forced them to
rely on the U.S. even though they were trying
to take more of a leadership role in the
operation.
It could be argued that had more of the
countries involved been contributing more of
their GDP to their forces in the first place
(especially to training pilots and updating their
technology), the U.S. would not have had to
employ its unique combat abilities as much as
it did. The two case studies show that free
riding occurs because NATO forces have not
modernized their forces well. Through the
theoretical application of collective action and
the joint-product model to case studies, burden
sharing is still not on the equal footing that the
U.S. would like. While there are many factors
involved in determining levels of free riding in
NATO, a large gap still needs to be closed
between the U.S. and its allies (especially
regarding military effectiveness). Although
×non-U.S. NATO allies are increasing their

spending, the effectiveness of their forces
proves that the U.S. is forced, due to its size,
to attend to unfulfilled facets of combat
preparedness. This, then, puts the obligation
of maintaining a modern military force on the
U.S. Therefore, it is forced to spend more
money while letting other nations free ride. In
the end, NATO is still engaged in a mindset of
relying on the U.S. to take on the more costly
aspects of alliance burden sharing.
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